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Abstract
The world has been challenged by rapidly spreading COVID-19 outbreaks for a year now. Southeast Asian countries have had different strategies to deal with
the pandemic. This review aimed to elaborate on Southeast Asian countries’ strategies in managing the trade-off between economic and public health, with
further consideration of how such approaches were associated with the dynamics of the number of cases and the speed of economic recovery. This review
evaluated the COVID-19 mitigation efforts spanning one year in the Southeast Asian (SEA) countries listed based on the Bloomberg COVID Resilience
Ranking. As of May 24, 2021, three SEA countries (Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia) were chosen from the better (27th), moderate (35th), and worst (42nd)
SEA country rankings. Peer-reviewed articles were obtained from Google Scholar and PubMed databases, and news articles were retrieved from Google
News. The data from government websites were also included. Sources were limited to those in the English and Indonesian languages that could be accessed
between January 2020 and May 2021. Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia were found to have significantly prioritized consideration of the economy in handling
the pandemic. Malaysia and Thailand had more stringent policies of imposing national lockdowns, while Indonesia had a partial lockdown. It was found that
a weak pandemic response may result in substantial economic loss.
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Introduction 
Countries have taken varying approaches to control
the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
With these approaches, various indicators can be
observed to classify how well a country or government
has handled the pandemic. Daily case and death rates
have been the most commonly used metrics to determine
how each country has addressed the pandemic.1
However, it is still difficult to draw any conclusions from
the trends of new cases until today. SEA countries
showed an increasing pattern in the number of daily cases
in the beginning period when the World Health
Organization (WHO) first declared COVID-19 as a
global pandemic.2 Then, the numbers decreased
gradually in later periods2 as certain countries, with
extensive data and experience shared between countries
and scientists, which allowed for recognition of the
nature of the virus and the formulation of more effective
measures.3 Following the decrease of new cases, several
countries started to loosen restrictions. After the case
rate plateaued at the end of 2020, some countries
experienced a second wave of the pandemic.4 The
dynamics of COVID-19 cases worldwide have prompted
the question of what measures governments have taken
to consistently control community transmission as the
number of daily cases remained low for months but then
increased once again.  
COVID-19 has challenged government leaders to
come up with strategies to control disease transmission
at the country level with consideration of the economic
impact of such measures. Leadership is an essential
aspect of handling a crisis,5 and it has been demonstrated
to define the course of steps taken during such difficult
events.5 Accordingly, the actions of leaders concerned
about political or business matters have contributed to
the fall of their respective nations during times of crisis.6
The decision to implement strategies that rely on trade-
offs between the economy and public health might affect
the dynamics of the number of cases and the speed of
economic recovery.7
The Bloomberg COVID Resilience Ranking has
tracked 53 countries according to their most negligible
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impact on the social, economic, and mortality impact. It
was assessed by COVID status (i.e., cases per 100,000 in
one month, the one-month fatality rate, total deaths per
one million, positive test rate, and percentage of people
covered by a vaccine) and quality of life (i.e., lockdown
severity, community mobility, 2021 GDP growth
forecast, universal health care coverage, and human
development index). Southeast Asian (SEA) countries
are distributed in the list from the upper to the lower
rankings,8 which indicates that, aside from their regional
and social backgrounds, leadership plays a significant
role in controlling the pandemic. Therefore, this review
evaluated the progress of one year after the advent of the
COVID-19 pandemic by looking at the leaders’ decision
to enact strategies based on a trade-off between economic
interests and public health for COVID-19 mitigation
among the SEA countries listed on the Bloomberg
COVID Resilience Ranking. Specifically, this paper
discussed the efforts of three SEA countries’
governments, listed in the ranking as representative of
better, moderate, and worse stages during the course of
the ongoing pandemic.
Method
This review included SEA countries on the Bloomberg
COVID Resilience Ranking (available online at
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/COVID-
resilience-ranking/). This ranking was chosen because it
comprehensively provides an indicator of COVID-19
status and quality of life. The COVID-19 indicators
consist of cases per 100,000 in one month, the one-
month fatality rate, total deaths per one million, positive
test rate, and the percentage of people covered by the
vaccine. The quality of life indicators included lockdown
severity, community mobility, 2021 GDP growth
forecast, universal health care coverage, and human
development index. 
The Bloomberg COVID Resilience Ranking tracks 53
countries that are divided into three stages of resiliency:
better (rank 1–29), moderate (rank 30–41), and worse
(rank 42–53). As of May 24, 2021, three SEA countries
were chosen as representatives from each stage. Thailand
was selected from the better stage (27), Malaysia from
the moderate stage (35), and Indonesia from the worse
stage (42).
This review drew upon the information related to the
countries’ strategies in handling the trade-off between
economic interests and public health; it then examined
how these approaches affected the dynamics of the
number of cases and the speed of economic recovery. An
Internet search was conducted in May 2021. Peer-
reviewed articles were obtained from the Google Scholar
and PubMed databases, and news articles were retrieved
from Google News. The data from government websites
were also included. Sources were limited to those in the 
English and Indonesian languages that could be accessed 
between January 2020 and May 2021.
The keywords used in Google Scholar and PubMed 
were “(Country name)” AND “COVID-19” AND  
“policy” OR “economy.” The search on Google News was 
performed with the following keywords: “Indonesia,” 
“Malaysia,” “Thailand,” “COVID-19,” “lockdown,” 
“Minister of Health,” “policy responses,” “law  
enforcement,” and “health-budgeting.” The search on 
government sites was performed to obtain information 
about policy responses and updates regarding the 
pandemic’s development. A narrative explanation was 
generated for the discussion. The discussion focused 
on how three countries managed the trade-off 
between economic interests and public health from 
January 2020 to May 2021.
Results
COVID-19 Situation
Thailand was the first country outside China to report 
the novel coronavirus on January 8, 2020.9 The cases 
gradually increased in the following weeks of January to 
February 2020. COVID-19 rapidly spread in the 
community in March 2020, with hundreds of cases 
detected daily.9 Thailand had successfully contained the 
first wave of COVID-19 in July 2020, with total cases of 
about 3,000. However, the total number of cases had 
skyrocketed to more than 170,000 by June 2021.10 
The COVID-19 pandemic started in Malaysia due to 
imported cases in January 2020.11 This phenomenon 
resulted in the first wave, with the number of positive 
cases rising to 22 by February 16, 2020. Since then, the 
second wave has followed, mainly due to local  
transmission. The second wave occurred roughly 
between February and June 2020 and involved a religious 
gathering at a mosque in Seri Petaling, Kuala Lumpur.12 
The two waves were handled relatively well, and 
Malaysian people enjoyed periods of relaxation.  
Unfortunately, the third wave began in September 2020. 
With a population of 32,750,801, Malaysia has so far 
recorded 616,815 positive cases and 3,378 deaths due to 
COVID-19 (as of June 8, 2021).13
Since its first case in March 2020, the number of cases 
in Indonesia has been increasing rapidly. While Thailand 
and Malaysia have faced a second or even third wave, the 
first wave in Indonesia has yet to cease. As of June 2021, 
the total number of confirmed cases was 1,831,773 or 
6,697 cases per one million people, with the daily new 
case rate averaging around 5,000.14 The daily positive 
rate is the second-highest in Southeast Asia after the 
Philippines.14 This number is considered high in the 
region, probably due to the lower testing rate.14
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The Thai government required that all confirmed 
cases be admitted to the hospital.9 This policy would have 
backfired without a strong healthcare capacity. 
Fortunately, Thailand’s healthcare system is one of the 
most robust globally, which is ranked second among 195 
countries.9 In the last four decades, Thailand has been 
hugely invested in expanding its health care 
infrastructure.15 In 2019, the total number of hospital 
beds was about 158,026 from 1,370 hospitals across 
Thailand, which equals 2.2 beds per 1,000 citizens.15 
This hospital bed-to-patient ratio may be lower than the 
average of OECD countries, but it was still sufficient to 
accommodate all COVID-19 patients during the first 
wave.9,15 With the demand for care has increased in the 
recent outbreak; the medical services department set up 
field hospitals to admit patients with mild or no 
symptoms.9 This strategy successfully reduced the fatality 
rate to a very low level.
Malaysia has 135 public hospitals, 210 private 
hospitals, nine special medical institutes, and 61,158 
doctors in terms of healthcare capacities. To improve 
COVID-19 case treatment, the Ministry of Health added 
800 new units of medical ventilators to 926 ventilator 
units already in intensive care unit (ICU) facilities, 
together with 152 non-invasive ventilators and 142 
transport ventilators.16 However, the demand may 
exceed the present resources required to control current 
and future transmission.17
The challenge faced by the Indonesian government in 
handling COVID-19 has been influenced by health 
facilities availability in the country. Before the pandemic, 
Indonesia had one hospital bed per 1,000 people.18 
Thankfully, the implementation of the large-scale social 
restrictions (LSSR)/Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar 
(PSBB) has been effective enough to delay hospital 
admission due to COVID-19 by 20 days.19 However, 
ICUs availability is also needed to handle critical care 
patients, which is predicted to be 30% of the total 
number of hospital admissions due to COVID-19. 
Meanwhile, Indonesia had 2.7 ICU beds per 100,000 
people, which is the fourth-lowest number in Southeast 
Asia.20
Government Response
The government of Thailand declared a state of 
emergency on March 26, 2020. The government then 
implemented strict public health measures, such as 
promoting personal hygiene, canceling public gatherings, 
and limiting international and domestic flights. The 
government also imposed a national lockdown starting 
on April 3, 2020.9 As of July 2020, the COVID-19 
transmission curve was successfully flattened, with 
around 3,000 cumulative cases being recorded.9 The 
recent surge of COVID-19 can be traced to the nightclub 
clusters in Bangkok in March 2021. Unlike in the first
wave, the Thai government is trying to avoid another 
national lockdown at all costs to save the economy.
In Malaysia, health examinations at each entry point 
were among the initial measures enacted to prevent the 
spread of illness. The next critical steps were to 
continuously screen and test high-risk individuals and 
trace and quarantine the contacts. The government also 
worked hard to increase the number of facilities capable 
of treating COVID-19 cases.21,22 A limited lockdown 
called a Movement Control Order (MCO) was first 
announced by Malaysia’s Prime Minister on March 18, 
2020.23 This order was enacted under the Prevention and 
Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988, and the Police 
Act 1967.22 The education, religious, and secondary 
sectors were closed, and interstate travel was banned. 
Only the head of the family could purchase groceries 
within a 10-kilometer radius. Police and military were 
deployed to monitor the movements of people. Recently, 
the government announced a total lockdown amid the 
COVID-19 surge.24 However, it should be noted that 
many people supported the initial decision to deploy an 
MCO considering the casualties of the outbreak.25
In Indonesia, the national strategy to handle the 
COVID-19 outbreak has been led by a special committee 
named Komite Penanganan COVID-19 dan Pemulihan 
Ekonomi Nasional (Committee for Handling COVID-19 
and the National Economic Recovery) ruled by 
Presidential Regulation No. 82 of 2020. This committee 
has been led by the Coordinating Minister of the 
Economy. The Minister of Health serves as the vice head 
of the committee. During the pandemic, the Minister of 
Health had been replaced on December 22, 2020. 
Previously, it has been widely known that the president 
had been critical of the low COVID-19 actual budget 
absorption, which was only at 20%, as allocated by the 
Ministry of Health under the former minister.26 
Indonesia implemented a partial lockdown under the 
LSSR policy. This consisted of large-scale social 
regulations, including the closure of public places, 
schools, restrictions on public transport, and limiting 
travel.27,28 In July 2020, Indonesia entered a new normal 
period with loosening restrictions in public places. 
Presidential Instruction No. 26 of 2020, issued on August 
4, encouraged regional leaders to enforce sanctions for 
not obeying public health protocols. The sanctions 
included reprimands, social work, administrative fines, 
or business closures.
Current Economic Situation
Thailand’s economy has been severely impacted by 
COVID-19, especially since it was in a delicate position 
even before the global pandemic.29 The World Bank 
estimated that Thailand’s economy shrunk by 6.5% in 
2020.29  Thailand’s economy heavily relies on  
international tourism, contributing to approximately
Healthcare Capacity
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12.0% of the total GDP.29 The tourism sector may not 
be fully recovered in the near future as the pandemic is 
still far from over. Private consumption also significantly 
contracted in 2020 despite the government providing 
5,000 THB per month in direct cash transfer to  
individuals affected by the pandemic.29 Mobility 
restriction and physical distancing measures make it 
increasingly difficult for the private sector to boost the 
economy.29 Therefore, the government could not afford 
to impose another national lockdown, which would 
inevitably sink the economy. 
Most of Thailand’s health budget for the fiscal year 
2022 is planned to be allocated to fund universal health 
coverage and to curb the COVID-19 pandemic.9 All 
COVID-19 medical services are paid by one of three 
health insurance schemes, including the Civil Servant 
Medical Benefit Scheme, Social Security Scheme, and 
Universal Coverage Scheme.9 In recent weeks, the Thai 
parliament agreed to allocate THB 295.7 billion for the 
health sector in the fiscal year of 2022. Most of this 
funding would be given to the universal healthcare 
coverage program, which would account for  
approximately THB 202 billion.30
The lockdown has had a significant socio-economic 
impact on Malaysia’s economic performance. In 2020, 
the GDP was estimated to have contracted 5.6 percent, 
mainly because of MCO implementation.31 To combat 
the pandemic, the government allocated RM 31.9 billion 
for the health budget in 2021, which was an increase of 
4.3% from the previous year. The scheme to strengthen 
the domestic supply chain and boost the production of 
locally manufactured medical devices will be derived 
from the new budget, which includes a RM 1.4 billion 
national development plan.32
According to the data provided by the Ministry of 
Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, the country’s 
health budget was planned to be 5% of the total 
government budget of 2020.33 Due to COVID-19, the 
government released Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 
2020 as a response to the pandemic to increase the 
funding in the health sector. It was stated that the change 
of budget plan should direct the country to focus on 
controlling the pandemic by sharpening the strategy for 
health and economic recovery due to the impact of 
COVID-19.34 The government’s consideration to also 
think about the effects of COVID-19 on the economy has 
been reasonable. The pandemic has affected broad 
sectors, including the economy, and the decline of 
tourism and the high unemployment rate are indications 
of this effect.35-37 In 2020, the GDP contracted by 
2.07%,38 slightly better than the situation in Thailand 
and Malaysia.
Discussion
The economy became a significant consideration in 
formulating COVID-19 response policies in Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia. In the short term, there may be 
a trade-off between economic damage and loss of life.39 
However, the economy may not fully recover without 
adequately handling the pandemic. In addition, a weak 
pandemic response has led to substantial economic loss 
due to premature deaths and “long COVID” related 
disabilities.
Historically, international tourism has always played 
a vital role in Thailand’s economy.40 This sector relies 
heavily on physical mobility and social interaction. 
Physical distancing policies enacted during the pandemic 
have inevitably hurt the tourism industry. Although the 
tourism sector’s contribution has been significant, the 
Thai government is not in a hurry to fully open the border 
for international arrivals and loosen physical distancing 
measures. Public health has remained the top priority in 
any policymaking during this pandemic. However, a 
recent Phuket sandbox model proposed by the Tourism 
Authority of Thailand (TAT) has elicited some critique. 
This model is the pilot project for re-opening Phuket 
Island for international vaccinated tourists without 
mandatory quarantine.41 As of June 7, 2021 many issues 
have not yet been clarified concerning this plan.41 
Moreover, the Center for COVID-19 Situation 
Administration (CCSA) has required a minimum of 
70% of Phuket’s residents to be vaccinated before 
tourism can re-open. However, only 60% of the 
Island’s target vaccination population of 466,587 have 
received the first shot, and only about 98,795 have 
been injected with the second shot.42
To help patients with financial difficulties, Malaysia’s 
Ministry of Health established a special fund known as 
the COVID-19 Fund. The government and private 
sectors contributed RM 1 million to this initiative, while 
NGOs and individuals were also welcome to donate. 
These funds have also helped those who had no income 
source during the quarantine and were used to support 
medical expenses and treatment processes.43 Malaysia 
has viewed this COVID-19 crisis as a public health crisis 
first and an economic crisis second. Thus, the economic 
policy was mainly focused on supporting public health 
measures to combat the pandemic while also protecting 
people’s and businesses’ wellbeing.44
Strategies designed to boost the tourism sector also 
received the Indonesian government’s attention at the 
beginning of the pandemic. In February 2020, when 
other countries decided to close the border because of 
the outbreak, the Indonesian government decided to 
provide a 30% discount for domestic and overseas 
tourists to boost the weakened tourism sectors due to the 
economic impact of COVID-19 worldwide.45 Similar
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tourism policies have gained criticism from the public. 
Currently, the Indonesian government is focusing on 
economic recovery, including the provision of stimulus 
payments for the tourism sector. These stimuli include 
IDR 3.3 trillion in grants for hotels and restaurants.46
Speeding up vaccination rollouts is a win-win solution 
for public health and economic recovery. Nevertheless, 
vaccination rollouts have been relatively slow in 
Thailand. The Bloomberg Resilience Ranking recorded 
only 2.1% of the Thai population as being vaccinated as 
of June 7, 2021.8 The low vaccination rate may hinder 
the control of COVID-19 transmission in Thailand, 
which has been stagnant. COVID-19 cases have been 
reported at around 2,000 per day in the past month.10 
The government currently relies on the Sinovac and 
Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines. Therefore, the  
government plans to speed up mass vaccination by 
injecting THB 3.59 billion into vaccination procurement 
and management.47 In addition, a total of THB 2.379 
billion would be allocated to the National Vaccine 
Institute for the development and manufacturing of 
locally made COVID-19 vaccines.47
Only 7.3% of the Malaysian population have received 
at least one dose of the COVID vaccine.48 Accordingly, 
the government plans to accelerate its national  
vaccination program. It is expected to reach the 80%
vaccination target by August 2021.49 The total RM 5 
billion federal COVID-19 vaccine program allocation has 
not been taken out from the country’s budget. Yet, it was 
taken from the Pemerkasa economic stimulus package 
and the National Trust Fund (KWAN)—a savings fund 
built from Malaysia’s natural resources, primarily 
through a donation from the oil and gas company, 
Petronas. This policy has been implemented to avoid a 
GDP deficit.50
In Indonesia, the total health budget in 2021 has been 
focused on the vaccination program. As the vaccination 
program became a priority, by June 2, 2021, 6% of the 
total population had received at least one dose of a 
vaccine.14 This is a notable effort for a country with a 
large population.  However, the education of the 
community regarding the concept of herd immunity 
needs to be improved. People need to be educated that 
wearing masks, washing hands, and avoiding crowds are 
still required even after completing two vaccination 
shots. Education with effective communication strategies 
is essential during outbreaks since well-educated citizens 
contribute to the collective approach of optimizing 
government regulations.51  Moreover, the target  
vaccination rate in Indonesia has been set at 70% of the 
total population. Looking at the current achievement, the 
number of people vaccinated is still far from this goal. 
Thailand was recognized as one of the best countries 
in curbing the COVID-19 spread in 2020.9 However, the
situation may differ in 2021. A recent surge of COVID-
19 cases began in the Greater Bangkok Area,10 as the 
virus was transmitted rapidly to all provinces after the 
Songkran holiday.10 Although the street water fight was 
banned this year, many Thais still took a trip to their 
hometowns.52 Policy responses have included issuing a 
nationwide mask mandate, closures of entertainment 
venues and businesses, and limits on restaurant and store 
operations.52 Despite the daily confirmed case number 
being equal to all cases during the entire first wave period 
(January–July 2020), the Thai government is hesitant to 
impose a strict national lockdown to avoid more 
profound economic damage.
At the beginning of the pandemic, Malaysians were 
unaware of the virus’s lethality and unprepared to deal 
with the pandemic, mainly because of the simultaneous 
political crisis and the conviction that the virus would 
not spread quickly in Malaysia.21 However, Malaysian 
people began to panic when the first two deaths were 
reported in mid-March, less than a week after Malaysia’s 
positive COVID-19 cases jumped from 99 to 200 at the 
start of the second wave.53 As a result, the government 
has taken numerous actions to assuage public concern 
and safeguard Malaysian citizens’ health.
The dilemma regarding the prioritization of the 
economy or health in Indonesia has led the nation to be 
ill-prepared in taking all the necessary measures to 
strictly limit public mobilization, even though the 
number of daily cases has increased steadily compared to 
neighboring countries.54 Instead of a total lockdown, 
Indonesia implemented a partial lockdown under the 
LSRR policy; a large-scale social restriction including the 
closure of public places and schools and limitations on 
public transport and other travel.27,28 In July 2020, 
Indonesia entered a new normal period with loosening 
restrictions on public places. This has encouraged the 
mindset in the public that COVID has ended. Moreover, 
there is a lack of positive laws regulating fines for not 
wearing masks, washing hands, or keeping distance. The 
decline of PSBB restrictions came in line with the 
occurrence of long holidays. From October to November 
2020, there were several public holidays, and the daily 
number of new cases increased after these days. For 
instance, it can be seen from the data that the number of 
confirmed cases increased steadily after the public 
holiday on November 5, 2020.14
Conclusion
At the beginning of the pandemic, Malaysia and 
Thailand implemented strict national lockdowns. These 
policies had successfully contained the spread of COVID-
19 in 2020, but Indonesia’s health system was on the 
brink of collapse at the same time. However, the 
performance of the economic indicator was slightly
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better in Indonesia, while Malaysia and Thailand’s 
economies hit rock bottom. 
No country could afford a strict lockdown forever 
because the pandemic may not disappear soon. 
Therefore, the authors recommend a combination 
of moderate control with solid law enforcement and 
the provision of cash transfers and other social 
assistance programs as a strategy to save 
lives and livelihoods. Second,  complacency, 
the loosening of public health restrictions, and slow 
vaccination rollouts may have contributed to the 
recent surge of COVID-19 in the region. 
All Southeast Asian countries have been 
relatively slow to provide COVID-19 
vaccinations. Therefore, speeding up vaccination 
rollouts is the crucial solution to flatten the COVID-19 
infection curve in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
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